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Abstract
An action-oriented perspective changes the role of an individual from a passive ob-
server to an actively engaged agent interacting in a closed loop with the world as well 
as with others. Cognition exists to serve action within a landscape that contains both. 
This chapter surveys this landscape and addresses the status of the  pragmatic turn. Its 
potential infl uence on science and the study of cognition are considered (including  per-
ception,  social cognition, social interaction,  sensorimotor entrainment, and  language 
acquisition) and its impact on how  neuroscience is studied is also investigated (with 
the notion that brains do not passively build models, but instead support the guidance 
of action). 
A review of its implications in robotics and  engineering includes a discussion of the 
application of enactive control principles to couple action and perception in  robotics as 
well as the conceptualization of system design in a more holistic, less modular manner. 
Practical  applications that can impact the human condition are reviewed (e.g., educa-
tional applications, treatment possibilities for developmental and psychopathological 
disorders, the development of  neural  prostheses). All of this foreshadows the potential 
societal implications of the pragmatic turn. The chapter concludes that an action-orient-
ed approach emphasizes a continuum of interaction between technical aspects of cogni-
tive systems and  robotics, biology, psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities, 
where the individual is part of a grounded cultural system.
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Embodied Cognition and Enactivism
The concept of embodied cognition generally considers extra-neural bodily 
structures and processes important for cognition. There are a number of dif-
ferent theories of embodied cognition. Wilson (2002) distinguishes between 
theories that emphasize:
• Situatedness
• Online or real-time processes
• Off-loading cognitive processing onto the environment (also referred 
to as embedded or scaffolded cognition)
• The idea that the environment itself is part of the cognitive system 
(sometimes called extended mind or distributed cognition)
• The idea that cognition is for action (sometimes called action-oriented 
or enactive cognition)
• The idea that offl ine cognition is body-based
We focus on enactive or action-oriented cognition, but we do include con-
cepts that involve embedded/scaffolded and extended/distributed cognition. 
Extended mind approaches include the idea of action-oriented representations, 
whereas more radical versions of  enactivism eschew  representationalism 
(Hutto and Myin 2013).
Action-oriented theories that emphasize  sensorimotor contingencies 
(O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004) are usually put under the heading of en-
activism. More radical forms of enactivism include the idea of sensorimotor 
contingencies, but also emphasize other aspects of  embodiment such as affec-
tivity (interoceptive, autonomic, emotional aspects),  reward, interest ( motiva-
tion), and embodied social interaction (Varela et al. 1992). Both enactive and 
extended approaches endorse the idea that cognition is not just “in the head.” 
Most embodied approaches accept the  Gibsonian idea of  affordances. Despite 
certain common elements, however, it is safe to say that not all embodied cog-
nitive theories agree on all issues.
Action-oriented theories of embodied cognition (including enactive and 
extended) are prefi gured in the work of American pragmatists such as  Peirce 
(1887) and  Dewey (1896, 1916, 1938). Dewey, for example, spoke of the or-
ganism environment as a single unit of explanation, suggesting that the en-
vironment is not only physical but also social, and emphasizing movement 
and our use of  tools and instruments as part of cognition (see Menary 2007, 
2010). Enactive theories fi nd important sources in the European philosophical 
tradition of phenomenology ( Husserl,  Heidegger, and  Merleau-Ponty) where 
perception is characterized as pragmatic, guided by what the agent can do (i.e., 
by embodied skills and motor possibilities). Phenomenological contributions 
to cognitive science champion embodied-enactive aspects. Such approaches 
include neurophenomenology (Varela 1996), where experimental subjects are 
trained in phenomenological methods that focus on  fi rst-person experience, 
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and “front-loaded” phenomenology, where phenomenological concepts or dis-
tinctions (e.g., sense of  agency vs. sense of  ownership for actions) are incorpo-
rated into experimental design (Gallagher and Zahavi 2012).
The enactive approach can be characterized by the following background 
assumptions (Varela et al. 1992; McGann 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2010; Engel 
2010; Engel et al. 2013):
1. Cognition is considered as the exercise of skillful know-how in situated 
and embodied action.
2. Cognition structures the world of the agent, which is not pregiven or 
predefi ned.
3. Cognition is not viewed as happening only in the brain; it emerges from 
processes in the  agent-environment loop. The intertwinement between 
agent and world is constitutive for cognition.
4. System states are thought to acquire  meaning by their functional role 
in the context of action, rather than through a representational mapping 
from a stimulus domain.
5. The approach aims at grounding more complex cognitive functions in 
sensorimotor coordination.
6. In contrast to classical cognitive science, which has an individualistic 
and disembodied view of cognition, the enactive approach strongly re-
fers to the embodied, extended, and socially situated nature of cogni-
tive systems.
7. The approach implies strong links to dynamical systems theory and 
emphasizes the key relevance of dynamic coupling and dynamic 
coordination.
As illustrated in Figure 20.1, the  pragmatic turn can be characterized in terms 
of various brands of action-oriented cognition. Parallel to the advent of enac-
tivism, such a turn has independently occurred in classical representational 
approaches as well. Importing action into the study of cognition cannot be 
considered a unique signature of enactivist agendas. Three major moves that 
one may discern in representational approaches to cognition and action are:
1. Theoretical: Cognition-for-action takes a new look at cognitive func-
tions (e.g., perception and attention) and emphasizes their role in ac-
tion. The aim is to fi nd out how these functions are constrained and 
shaped by the requirements of action control.
2. Experimental: Action is viewed as an object of study itself (with regard 
to production and perception as well as their mutual relationships). 
The aim is to investigate the representational underpinnings of action 
representation, with particular emphasis on scenarios of social interac-
tion and communication (where action production and perception are 
combined).
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3. Theoretical and experimental: Action is seen as a constitutive ingredi-
ent of cognition (particularly high-level cognition). The aim is to trace 
the latent and implicit involvement of action in cognition (coming fair-
ly close to what nonrepresentational enactivism claims as well).
Action-related approaches to cognition have important characteristics. First, 
they allow for actions to generate and modulate perception, which allows for 
much more dynamic and active perception. Second, they allow for an ontoge-
netic perspective that can account for dynamic changes of the cognitive system 
over time and development. This approach is thus much more fl exible than 
the more or less invariant information-processing machinery assumed by the 
cognitive approach. Third, the assumption that cognition is for action allows 
for a reinterpretation of various cognitive phenomena, especially limitations 
of processing. For instance, considering that  attention may ultimately serve 
action allows one to understand that the purpose of selection is not to shield a 
capacity-limited system against stimulus overfl ow but to allow actions to be 
optimally fed with actual relevant information. If there is a limitation, it is on 
the action side—not on the input side.
Does This Pragmatic Turn Constitute a New Paradigm?
Kuhn (1962/1970) did not invent the term paradigm but he is largely responsi-
ble for how it is used today. A  paradigm describes a collection of ideas—theo-
ries, concepts, laws, and experimental methods—that are shared by a commu-
nity of scientists as a basis for describing the current status of knowledge about 
their domain and plans to advance knowledge within that domain. Although 







Figure 20.1 The primacy of action is constitutive of enactive and action-oriented ap-
proaches. Representational approaches address aspects of cognition for action. This 
common ground constitutes the pragmatic turn.
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view and proposed that at all stages in the development of a fi eld there are 
paradigms around which scientifi c communities cohere. For Kuhn, the history 
of science is described by the changing status of different paradigms, includ-
ing periods of more incremental research (“normal science”), where scientists 
work to develop the ideas within a paradigm, as well as more radical events 
(paradigm shifts), where a previously dominant paradigm crumbles and is re-
placed by another. Paradigm shifts happen when results that do not fi t within 
the existing approach (so-called anomalies) accumulate and the new paradigm 
better addresses the anomalies and is consistent with much of the previous data 
accounted for under the earlier view. Experiments which identify key anoma-
lies can be viewed as critical ones, although attribution of such signifi cance is 
always easier in hindsight. It is the nature of scientifi c paradigms that ideas in 
one do not necessarily translate into another. For example, Einstein’s theory 
of relativity reformulates fundamental concepts in physics in ways that cannot 
be fully expressed in terms of classical Newtonian physics. As a result of the 
changed view that results from a paradigm shift, scientifi c understanding of 
the world is qualitatively different in some important ways from how it was 
previously.
Looking at the action-oriented view in cognitive science, it is diffi cult to 
argue that it constitutes one paradigm. Instead, we might say that there are a 
number of related paradigms which share some common emphases on the role 
of action. Do we have a paradigm shift? Twenty years ago, not many people 
thought motor activity could infl uence perception. Now there is a consensus 
that the motor system contributes to understanding. Perhaps the important point 
is that to make progress from this proposed paradigm shift, we must focus not 
only on high-level defi nitions but also on how these concepts will lead to new 
experimental paradigms,1 both in the natural sciences and medicine as well as 
in the engineering sciences. To understand cognition, it has to be viewed in the 
context of meaningful behavior. Independently of whether the resulting domi-
nant paradigm might be strong enactivism or a hybrid paradigm, the crucial 
point is to take action into account as a major constituent of cognition.
How Does the Pragmatic Turn Change How We Do Science?
A New Perspective on Perception
The implications  of the  pragmatic turn can be illustrated by referring to one 
of the most discussed versions of an action-oriented approach: the  sensorimo-
tor contingency (SMC) theory developed by O’Regan and Noë (2001). In this 
framework, the agent’s acquired knowledge of SMCs (i.e., the rules governing 
sensory changes produced by motor actions) are critical for both development 
1 The term “experimental paradigm” refers to specifi c procedures and protocols and should not 
to be confused with the term “paradigm” defi ned above.
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and maintenance of cognitive capacities.  Vision, as an example, involves much 
more than the processing of retinal information. According to this view, seeing 
corresponds to a way of acting, to exploratory activity mediated by deploy-
ment of specifi c skills and knowledge of SMCs. Neural activity patterns that 
emerge in visual cortex do not in themselves constitute seeing. Rather, the brain 
supports vision by enabling exercise and mastery of  SMCs. This concept is 
in strong opposition to classical representation-centered approaches of vision, 
such as those of Marr (1982) or Biederman (1987), which assume that percep-
tion consists essentially in building context-neutral descriptions of objects that 
are stored in the brain, irrespective of any actions that might be performed by 
the agent. In contrast, according to the sensorimotor account, the concept of an 
object would consist in a family of related SMCs, and thus clustering across 
these contingencies provides the basis of learning object structures. One of the 
interesting implications of this account is that the distinction between declara-
tive and procedural knowledge, which fi gures prominently in cognitivist ap-
proaches, dissolves in favor of the notion that different types of knowledge 
might be seen as repertoires of contingencies with different degrees of com-
plexity. The SMC approach also stipulates interesting predictions for changes 
in patients with brain disorders. A key prediction is that patients with motor 
defi cits (e.g.,  Parkinson disease or  amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) should exhibit 
perceptual and cognitive defi cits that result from an impoverished repertoire of 
SMCs that can still be utilized by the patient.
Concept of Attention as Action-Constrained Sensory Refocusing
Research on  neural mechanisms of attention serve as an example of how an 
action-oriented account may inform the analysis of presumed “high-level” 
cognitive capacities. The “ premotor theory of  attention” (Rizzolatti et al. 
1987) introduced the idea that the selection of sensory information should be 
modulated and focused by constraints arising from current action  planning and 
execution. In agreement with this prediction, several studies have shown that 
movement preparation can lead to attentional shifts (Collins et al. 2008, 2010) 
and to changes in the acquisition of object-related information (Craighero et 
al. 1999; Eimer and van Velzen 2006; Fagioli et al. 2007). Functional imag-
ing studies and neurophysiological recordings have provided evidence that the 
modulatory bias imposed by attention may indeed arise from premotor regions, 
in particular the frontal eye fi elds (Donner et al. 2000; Moore and Fallah 2001). 
MEG experiments on visual attention have shown that premotor regions like 
the frontal eye fi eld are involved in top-down modulation of sensory process-
ing through selective enhancement of dynamic coupling, expressed by phase 
coherence of fast neuronal oscillations between premotor, parietal, and sensory 
regions (Siegel et al. 2008). Similar evidence has also been obtained in a re-
cent EEG study using an ambiguous audiovisual stimulus. Analysis of neural 
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coherence revealed that large-scale interactions in a network of premotor, pari-
etal, and temporal regions modulate the perception of the ambiguous stimulus 
(Hipp et al. 2011). Taken together, these fi ndings provide clear support for an 
action-oriented account of attention. Actually, these studies suggest a shift in 
the concept of  attention, which may indeed most appropriately be described 
as a bias in sensory processing that is procured by the current action context.
A New Perspective on Social Cognition
Different versions of the action-oriented view have had a major impact on 
social cognition research. Previously, social cognition research focused on ex-
plicit  symbolic communication, on  mind reading as theoretical inference, and 
on social  categorization. One focus was on person perception, for example, 
in the mechanisms of  face identifi cation (Kanwisher et al. 1997), assigning 
traits to a person or categorization of others as in-group/out-group (Macrae and 
Bodenhausen 2000). Action-oriented views have brought social interaction 
into the foreground (Prinz 2012; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004):  simulationist 
models emphasize  common coding and  mirroring,  two related representational 
and brain mechanisms for matching one’s own actions and others’ actions. This 
has sparked new experiments on  imitation as well as the  planning and execu-
tion of joint actions, such as carrying a table or playing a piano duet (Knoblich 
et al. 2011). Dynamic systems approaches highlight the importance of tem-
poral entrainment in interpersonal action coordination (Riley et al. 2011). 
Enactivist approaches have brought to the foreground peoples’ experiences 
during  joint action (De Jaegher et al. 2010). Together, the different action-
centered mechanisms have defi ned a new perspective on social cognition, and 
they have started to infl uence views of how individual cognition works (e.g., 
Pickering and Garrod 2013b).
Studying Social Interaction through Sensorimotor Entrainment
In classical representation-oriented approaches  of social cognition, agents 
are thought to interact with conspecifi cs based on their capacity to develop a 
“ theory of mind”; that is, to derive complex models of the intentions, beliefs, 
and personalities of other agents (Carruthers and Smith 1996). In this frame-
work, which has also been termed the “ spectator theory” of social cognition 
(Schilbach et al. 2013), the primary mode of interaction with the social envi-
ronment is that of a detached observer who theorizes and produces inferences 
about other participants. The pragmatic turn inspires an alternative view which 
assumes that even complex modes of social interaction may be grounded 
in basic sensorimotor patterns enabling the dynamic coupling of agents (Di 
Paolo and De Jaegher 2012). Such sensorimotor patterns, or contingencies, 
are known to be highly relevant in cognition (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Engel 
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et al. 2013; Maye and Engel, this volume). A key hypothesis that follows from 
this approach is that learning and mastery of action-effect contingencies may 
also be critical for predicting consequences of the action of others and, thus, 
to enable effective coupling of agents in social contexts. According to this 
notion, social interaction depends on dynamic coupling of agents; the interac-
tion dynamics provides a clue to social understanding and shares aspects with 
the interactionist concept of  social cognition (Di Paolo and De Jaegher 2012; 
Gallagher 2004).  This concept also agrees well with the joint action model by 
Knoblich and colleagues, who predict that  shared  intentionality can arise from 
 joint action (Sebanz et al. 2006).
Action-Oriented Word Learning in Language Acquisition
The advantage of considering an enactive approach in cognitive development 
has been clearly demonstrated in the domain of child  language acquisition.2 
Word learning has often been characterized in terms of the potential ambiguity 
when a word is uttered and the referent could be any one of a number of possi-
ble objects in the visual scene. In this characterization, the infant passively at-
tends to the words and the cluttered scene. How would this scene change in an 
enactive setting? There is evidence that gestures (especially pointing gestures) 
by caregivers correlate with gestures by infants and, critically, that gestures 
produced by infants at 14 months predict vocabulary at later age (Özçalışkan 
et al. 2009; Rowe and Goldin-Meadow 2009). This indicates the importance 
of the action-oriented communicative context for language acquisition. In this 
context, Yu and Smith (2013) examined child-parent dyads during word learn-
ing, while the children wore head-mounted cameras that indicated where they 
were looking. The data revealed that children were not passive, but grasped 
and held the objects in question, creating conditions where referential ambigu-
ity was eliminated, and word learning effi cacy was maximized. This action-
oriented shift in the study of language acquisition will likely fi nd useful appli-
cation as well in the context of the social dynamics that will similarly reduce 
referential ambiguity (Dominey and Dodane 2004).
Action-Centered Approach to Neuroscience
Peter König said: “If you only pose simple questions, you only get simple an-
swers.” In this spirit, we need to reformat questions about the nervous system 
as a complex system in an action-centered context that also involves extra-
neural components. A reductionist approach misses elements of the system that 
were designed or which evolved to work in the real world. The problem is that 
mainstream  neuroscience is stuck in the old model where subjects are often 
2 Embodied language processing is another hallmark area where the action centeredness of cog-
nition (in this case language) is primary.
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passive or anesthetized. In classic vision and sensory experiments, at best, sub-
jects report what they sensed passively; at worst, they are stimulated while 
anesthetized and unable to generate behavior that determines what they sense. 
Results from these open-loop experiments have been interpreted with static 
maps consisting of neurons that perform single, discrete functions. This points 
to another shortcoming of conventional neuroscience. It is as if each cell has 
one function and “causes” a change in a single output region. This is far from 
accurate. We now know that each cell encodes many parameters simultane-
ously and sends output to many places. These neurons “operate” continuously, 
not just when they receive input from a single source. The “causal” output 
(defi ned as the ability to change another neuron’s probability of discharge) is 
typically very weak. It takes many neurons acting together to generate an ac-
tion potential in another neuron. The “causal” chain is very noisy, can only be 
defi ned statistically, and is likely context dependent. It is diffi cult to decode in-
formation from a single neuron because its fi ring rate-parameter correlation is 
very weak; the change in discharge rate associated with any given parameter is 
small. However, across a population, if these small changes are consistent, the 
representation of the parameter value will emerge clearly. Describing  causality 
in a complex system is diffi cult and can best be described as statistical struc-
ture. Common input to the population generates correlation between members 
of the population, and this structure can be recognized with proper analyses.
Changes in Conceptual and Methodological Orientation 
of Neuroscience Suggested by the Pragmatic Turn
A pragmatic turn in cognitive science will profoundly change our view of the 
brain and its function. Brains will no longer be considered only as devices for 
building models of the world (the “representationalist” view), but will instead 
be hypothesized to support the guidance of action. A key assumption is that ac-
tion shapes brain structure and is constitutive for brain function. Importantly, 
this would hold not only during development, but also for the functioning of 
the adult brain.
These considerations suggest a refocusing of the conceptual premises of 
neuroscientifi c research. The following premises contribute to defi ning a 
framework for action-oriented, pragmatic neuroscience:
1. The primary concern of the experimenter is not the relation of neural 
activity patterns to stimuli, but to the action at hand and the situation in 
which the subject under study is currently engaged.
2. The functional roles of neural states might be viewed as supporting the 
capacity of structuring situations through action, rather than as “encod-
ing” information about pregiven objects or events in the world.
3. Investigation of neural function encompasses the view that cognition is 
a highly active, selective, and constructive process.
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4. Sensory processing should be considered in a holistic perspective, as 
being subject to strong top-down infl uences that continuously create 
predictions about forthcoming sensory events and eventually refl ect 
constraints from current action.
5. The function of neurons and neural modules might not be considered in 
isolation, but with proper reference to other subsystems and the actions 
of the whole cognitive system.
6. Investigating the intrinsic dynamics of the brain becomes increasingly 
important, because interactions within and across neural assemblies are 
constitutive for the operations of the cognitive system.
Reorienting the focus of scientifi c investigation of cognitive processing will 
likely require the repertoire of neuroscientifi c methodology to be geared to-
ward action-oriented experimental strategies. Some requirements of such 
methodological reorientation include:
1. Experiments must avoid studying passive subjects and, instead, allow 
for active  exploration (e.g., free viewing, manual exploration).
2. Improved technologies are needed to track the actions of one or several 
interacting subjects.
3. Current neuroscientifi c methods (e.g., EEG, MEG, and fMRI) are lim-
ited with respect to subjects’ ability to execute movements, either due 
to the design of the measurement apparatus or to artifacts being intro-
duced into the signal by movement. Consequently, novel and improved 
technologies for acquiring neural activity and biosignals during move-
ment are needed, as well as for analysis strategies that separate move-
ment artifact from true signal.
4. Exploration of the relationship of neural activity with action param-
eters calls for the recording of nonneural, action-related signals. These 
may include, but are not restricted to, EMG, displacements, forces, 
heart and breathing rate, and possibly changes of the surroundings.
5. New data analysis techniques will be required to (a) examine correla-
tions between behavior and high-dimensional neurophysiological sig-
nals and (b) develop methodologies that consider massively distributed 
coding both within and across brain structures.
6. Technologies allowing controlled manipulation of SMCs will likely be-
come increasingly important.  Virtual reality setups may become crucial 
experimental tools.
In summary, the pragmatic turn has had an important infl uence in changing the 
way that science is done. But what can we draw from these examples? From 
a strong enactivist view, it appears that as soon as time is critical for immedi-
ate interactions in a joint task, representational theories may have nothing to 
say. This suggests that within the framework of action there is a particularly 
highlighted status for interpersonal action. Interpersonal action is different, in 
From “The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science,” 
Andreas K. Engel, Karl J. Friston, and Danica Kragic, eds. 2016. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18, 
series ed. J. Lupp. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-03432-6. 
 Implications of Action-Oriented Paradigm Shifts 343
the relational aspect: the object of my interaction is also interacting, generating 
 reciprocity in prediction when interacting with others.
Implications for Robotics and Engineering
In defi ning a shift in perspective on the status of agents acting in the world, 
the pragmatic turn has immense potential to change the fi elds of  robotics and 
 engineering. One could say that robots have always been embodied and prag-
matic in the sense that they are physical devices designed to perform useful 
actions in the world. However, with respect to high-level tasks, roboticists 
adopted the  representationalist stance which came from good old-fashioned 
 artifi cial intelligence (GOFAI; Haugeland 1985). This yielded the classical 
sense-think-act control architectures which emphasized on the “think” part 
that involved building and updating world models and planning the next ac-
tion using AI techniques operating on these models. Sensing and acting were 
initially regarded as straightforward interfaces with the real world and were 
thus considered less interesting or challenging research problems. A good ex-
ample is the Stanford Cart (Moravec 1983). As a result, real-time responsive-
ness was lost.
Embodiment, Compliance, and Soft Robotics
The pragmatic turn goes hand in hand with an  embodied turn. The properties of 
physical bodies were completely neglected in the strand of  robotics that came 
out of the GOFAI tradition. Even in more recent and much more impressive 
examples that successfully interact with the world in real time, like the DARPA 
Grand Challenge winner autonomous car Stanley (Thrun et al. 2006), a clear 
separation between body and brain is apparent. Indeed, the design philoso-
phy in the DARPA  challenge was: “treat autonomous navigation as a software 
problem” (Thrun et al. 2006, their emphasis). This philosophy is in stark con-
trast with the embodied perspective that posits tight coupling between brain/
controller, body, and environment (e.g., Pfeifer and Scheier 1999).
A classic and extreme example of the fact that behavior may be generated 
by a completely brain-less mechanical system are the  passive dynamic walkers 
(McGeer 1990). Although such contraptions are highly dependent on their eco-
logical niche (e.g., slope of particular inclination), to some extent “pure phys-
ics walking” can already display simple “adaptive” properties, like robustness 
to perturbations. This is achieved through mechanical feedback and has been 
called self-stabilization (e.g., Blickhan et al. 2007). Another ingenious demon-
stration from robotics where morphology decisively contributes to the genera-
tion of behavior is the “universal gripper” (Brown et al. 2010): A bag of ground 
coffee is pressed onto an object and let to conform to its shape. Afterward, a 
vacuum pump evacuates air from the gripper, making the granular material jam 
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and stabilizing the grasp. Another concerns the amazing climbing capabilities 
of geckos, which rely on van der Waals forces between their feet and the sur-
face on which they are climbing; these are strong enough thanks to a hierarchi-
cal structure of compliance from centimeter to 500 nanometer scales (Autumn 
et al. 2002). These fi ndings inspired the design of Stickybot, a robot that can 
climb smooth vertical surfaces (Kim et al. 2007).
Unlike “high-level” robotics capitalizing on the  GOFAI (thus overlooking 
the importance of the body and closed-loop real-time interaction with the en-
vironment), control engineers would consider exactly these aspects as their 
“bread and butter.” They would understand the robot as a dynamic system 
governed by differential equations. It responds to control input in a way that 
is defi ned by the body’s structure and its interaction with the environment. 
Furthermore, adding a feedback loop allows shaping this response to achieve a 
desired behavior or goal state. The challenge includes identifying and modeling 
the dynamic system (i.e., fi nding the linear or nonlinear differential equations, 
deciding around which sensors to place the feedback loops, and designing the 
controller itself). For linear systems, a large body of powerful and well-under-
stood mathematical tools exists to analyze the system’s response and design 
appropriate controllers. However, the majority of real systems are governed 
by nonlinear dynamics. While a number of techniques exist to cope with these 
kinds of systems, they are usually far more complex to compute, apply only to 
a subset of systems, or approximate the nonlinear with linear dynamics.
As a result, the plant in a control system is typically treated as fi xed, and 
the overall tendency has been to suppress its complex nonlinear dynamics in 
favor of stiff and linear behavior. Often this approach works surprisingly well. 
However, “linear systems are not rich enough to describe many commonly 
observed phenomena” (Sastry 1999:2). Complex and soft bodies offer new 
possibilities which can be exploited; however, they also pose diffi culties for 
classic control approaches (see Hoffmann and Müller 2014).
Complementary to passive compliance,3 there is an interest in active com-
pliance where a controller mimics elasticity using otherwise stiff actuators. 
Although these kinds of systems are not as energy effi cient as passive systems, 
they offer the possibility to study variable stiffness as well as to study where it 
is benefi cial to introduce compliance in a system. The importance of compli-
ance has been demonstrated for robotic  locomotion (e.g., Kalakrishnan et al. 
2010; Semini et al. 2013) and manipulation (e.g., Righetti et al. 2014; Deimel 
et al. 2013) where it increases robustness against perturbations that may be 
due to inaccuracies and noise in perception and actuation. Instead of precise-
ly planning a movement in joint space, a feedback loop is closed around the 
3 Compliance is the opposite of stiffness. A stiff system can move along a desired trajectory or 
toward a goal position and will remain in this state no matter what external forces are applied 
to it. A compliant system allows deviations from these desired positions that may be introduced 
by external forces.
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interaction forces between robot and environment such that it can gracefully 
give in when experiencing unexpected contact with the environment. These 
challenges are taken up by the growing fi eld of “ soft robotics” (e.g., Albu-
Schäffer et al. 2008; Pfeifer et al. 2012; Trimmer 2013).
Action in Robotic Perception
One of the interesting claims of the enactive approach is that there may be no 
principle difference between “high-level” cognitive processes and “low-level” 
sensorimotor functions. Instead, the former is seen as grounded in and emerg-
ing from the latter. Thus perception cannot be treated as a passive and disem-
bodied  process: it is critically shaped by the morphological properties of the 
whole agent (including, of course, its sensory apparatus) as well as by the ac-
tions executed by the agent. This is in contrast with the prevailing approaches 
to robotic  perception,  vision in particular (e.g., Horn 1986).
 Object concepts and  object recognition may be considered to illustrate this. 
From an enactive perspective, object concepts do not consist of feature-based 
descriptions stored in memory agnostic to any action contexts. Objects would 
be defi ned by sets of possible actions that can be performed on them, and 
knowledge of an object concept would consist in the mastery of the relevant 
object-related SMCs (Engel et al. 2013; Maye and Engel, this volume). This 
view is supported by studies on object recognition in humans and robotic sys-
tems. Evidence in humans clearly demonstrates a dependence of exploratory 
eye movements on the specifi c task given prior to viewing an image (Yarbus 
1967). The infl uence of semantic information, also in terms of object  iden-
tity, is visible in the results. Furthermore, there is evidence that visual  object 
recognition depends on exploratory eye movements during free viewing of 
images. Using ambiguous images, a recent study showed that eye movements 
performed prior to conscious object recognition predict the object identity rec-
ognized later (Kietzmann et al. 2011). For artifi cial vision systems, these ideas 
were fi rst explored in the area of  active vision and perception (Ballard 1991; 
Bajcsy 1988). They focused on implementing systems both in hardware and 
software that have the ability to choose actively what to sense. More recently, 
the area of interactive perception goes beyond the mere selection of percepts 
toward actively changing the state of the environment to increase information 
gain. In studies on  robot vision, it has been shown that a visual scene can be 
disambiguated by actively manipulating objects in the scene through a  robotic 
arm (Fitzpatrick and Metta 2002; Björkman et al. 2013; Högman et al. 2013). 
Similar implications apply to other sensory modalities. For example, a quad-
ruped robot running on different ground is critically able to improve terrain 
discrimination if a history of the actions taken (gaits used) is considered to-
gether with sensory stimulations induced in tactile, proprioceptive, and inertial 
sensors (Hoffmann et al. 2012).
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A Holistic Distributed Approach to Control: An Action-
Oriented Systems Engineering Perspective
The  representationalist view of cognition  has some commonalities with tradi-
tional systems engineering4 in the sense that it heavily relies on top-down de-
sign and modularization. Processing is often central and sequential, and differ-
ent modules are recruited to perform their part in a pipeline-like manner (like 
sense-think-act). This approach is dominant in the  engineering disciplines, 
because it allows for effi cient separation of subtasks and distribution of work 
among different units.
However, as has already been argued extensively, humans and animals do 
not seem to rely on the same type of architecture. Instead, an effective and 
smooth interaction with their environment emerges from the interplay of a 
plethora of physical and informational processes that operate in parallel and 
have different couplings between them. This was articulated by Rodney Brooks 
when he openly attacked the GOFAI position in seminal papers:  “Intelligence 
without representation” (Brooks 1991b) and “Intelligence without reason” 
(Brooks 1991a). Through building robots that interact with the real world, such 
as insect robots (Brooks 1989), Brooks realized that “when we examine very 
simple level intelligence we fi nd that explicit representations and models of the 
world simply get in the way. It turns out to be better to use the world as its own 
model” (Brooks 1991b:396). Inspired by biological  evolution, Brooks created 
a decentralized control architecture consisting of different layers: every layer 
a more or less simple coupling of sensors to motors. The levels operated in 
parallel, but were built in a hierarchy, hence the term  subsumption architecture 
(Brooks 1986).
This approach proved to be effective in “low-level” tasks, such as walking 
or obstacle avoidance. However, to our knowledge, it has not demonstrated, 
to date, how it could scale to more “cognitive” tasks, beyond the immediate 
“here-and-now” timescale of the agent. Growing evidence from biology sug-
gests that this approach has been adopted by humans and animals and thus can 
be scaled up. Therefore, if we take the enactive approach seriously, we need to 
revise the way robots are  designed. Here, we elaborate on a few points toward 
this goal:
1. From centralized modules to parallel, loosely coupled processes: 
“Intelligence is emergent from an  agent-environment interaction based 
on a large number of parallel, loosely coupled processes that run asyn-
chronously and are connected to the agent’s sensorimotor apparatus.” 
4 Systems engineering was initially developed in the context of complex spacecraft system de-
sign (including the spacecraft and the associated ground data systems). Our perspective here 
is to in no way call into question the validity of this methodology, but rather to recognize that 
it was developed for a class of systems which do not at all have the same interaction require-
ments that one fi nds in real-time social interaction.
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(Pfeifer and Scheier 1999:303). This contrasts with the classical ap-
proach consisting of centralized, functional modules operating sequen-
tially. Furthermore, unlike the classical scheme, all processes operate 
essentially in a closed loop through the environment and on different 
timescales. In addition, as we are learning from the brain, process spe-
cialization is much weaker than representationalist views of the mind 
envisioned: different circuits are dynamically recruited for different 
tasks when need arises. This insight should fl ow into action-oriented 
and embodied design methodologies. Rather than starting out with a 
modularization of the system into functional blocks, it may be more 
benefi cial to begin thinking about the interfaces. Modules (in a weaker 
sense) can subsequently be plugged in. This may have a profound in-
fl uence on how the modules are designed by the end of the process. 
An even stronger version of this methodology would fi rst be to design 
entire feedback loops. This would shift the focus away from modules 
toward combinations of different feedback loops.
2.  Timing is important: Real-time interaction with the world and with 
other agents is critical. For example, in  human-robot  interaction, we 
are still very far from the natural “fl uid” interaction that humans have 
among themselves. A similar observation can be made for physical 
contact interactions between the robot and its environment. When it 
comes to manipulation or  locomotion in unstructured environments, 
the abilities of robots lag far behind those of humans in terms of dex-
terity, robustness, and speed. The low-level bodily and sensorimotor 
levels with fast feedback loops as well as their combination, integra-
tion, and coupling should play an important role in solving this lack of 
fl uidity. We realize that for temporal coordination (either during verbal 
interaction with a person or physical interaction with the environment), 
underlying processes cannot be sequential and feedforward but have to 
be parallel, asynchronous, and predictive.
3. Self-organized task solving: Imagine the task of cleaning a table. If a 
household robot were to solve it in the classical approach, it would 
perform image segmentation fi rst and then try to identify all the ob-
jects in the scene. Based on a model acquired this way, it could set it-
self a  goal state (e.g.,  clear the table) and then apply search techniques 
from AI to obtain a complete plan on how to proceed. Intuitively, it is 
evident that this is not how a human would solve such a task: a human 
would most likely remove objects within reach without fully planning 
out the remaining steps. In the end, paraphrasing Brooks, the table is 
there and one does not need a model to clean it. Thus, seemingly com-
plex problems can often be greatly simplifi ed through sensorimotor 
coordination and by off-loading complex planning to the brain-body-
environment interaction.
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In summary, we are convinced that the embodied, action-oriented, or enac-
tive approach has important consequences for the way robots and their control 
systems are designed. However, for some of the implications—in particular, 
to move away from specialized, clearly separated modules—the path to their 
adoption by industry may not be easy.
Practical Applications of the Action-Oriented Approach
We have come to be convinced of the potential impact of this change in per-
spective. Clearly, such a change in perspective must generate practical applica-
tions. These  practical applications can be seen in domains that include educa-
tion, clinical therapy, and the development of enactive  prosthetic devices.
Education
Historically, the pragmatic approach has had a signifi cant impact on educa-
tion. While we will not treat this subject in detail, we note that John  Dewey, in 
particular, had a profound commitment to and infl uence on public education. 
Dewey (1897, 1900, 1902, 1916, 1938) advocated the importance of educa-
tion proceeding in a context of interaction, where  curiosity and discovery mo-
tivated the student’s active search for knowledge. Similarly, action-oriented 
education would emphasize the importance of participatory aspects of learning 
situations. Instead of “sitting in place” in a classroom, listening or working 
with books or even desktop technologies, action-oriented education would em-
phasize the use of one’s whole body for learning. In contrast to conceptions of 
learning and cognition modeled on information processing and amodal prob-
lem solving, for example, the use of computer-generated interactive  simula-
tions (mixed reality  immersive technologies)—where students can enter into 
a whole-body engagement with a subject matter—has been shown to increase 
learning speed and accuracy compared to desktop computer use (Lindgren and 
Moshell 2011; Lindgren and Johnson-Glenberg 2013).
Clinical Applications in Aphasia
Research in action-centered cognitive  neuroscience has led to the development 
of a new translational method for the treatment of language defi cits, or apha-
sias. This method, called  intensive language action therapy, has yielded signifi -
cant improvements in language and communication abilities, even at chronic 
stages of poststroke  aphasia, in contrast to conventional approaches, which 
have not demonstrated comparable effects (Berthier and Pulvermüller 2011). 
Further translational progress may be achieved by developing similar methods 
for other neurological defi cits affecting language and action.
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Enactive Approaches to Developmental Disorders
Sensorimotor problems can be found in a number of developmental disorders. 
In  autism spectrum disorder (ASD), for example, infants who are later diag-
nosed with autism display sensorimotor problems (e.g., postural stability, gait, 
timing and coordination of motor sequences, anticipatory adjustments and face 
expression) before they reach the developmental age associated with  theory of 
mind, when typically developing children engage in  joint  attention and  joint 
action with others and are learning to communicate (Trevarthen and Delafi eld-
Butt 2013; Gallese et al. 2013; Cattaneo et al. 2007; Cook et al. 2013; Gallagher 
2004; Hilton et al. 2012; Fabbri-Destro et al. 2009; Whyatt and Craig 2013; 
David et al. 2014). In individuals with ASD, Torres and colleagues show the 
occurrence of disrupted patterns in re-entrant (afferent, proprioceptive) senso-
ry feedback that usually contributes to the autonomous regulation and coordi-
nation of motor output, and supports  volitional control and fl uid, fl exible tran-
sitions between intentional and spontaneous behaviors (Torres 2013; Torres 
et al. 2013). In ASD, as well as in other developmental disorders (e.g.,  Down 
 Syndrome), disruptions in motor processes may partly explain why individu-
als show diffi culties in distinguishing goal-directed from goal-less movement 
(Torres 2013; Brincker and Torres 2013), anticipating the consequences of 
their own impending movements and applying fi ne-tuned discriminations to 
the actions and emotional facial expressions of others during real-time social 
interactions. These studies hold important implications for  future research and 
therapeutic interventions, although further research is required to understand 
differences among sensorimotor problems in the different disorders and what 
precisely they contribute to each one (Gallagher and Varga 2015).
Action-Oriented Approaches to Schizophrenia
The early work by Elaine Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker and Lewine 
1990) has motivated investigations of motor activity in people with  schizo-
phrenia. Ford and coworkers showed that 2-year-old children, who became 
schizophrenic in adulthood, differed from their healthy siblings by exhibiting 
motor awkwardness and social withdrawal. Ford argues that this could be due 
to an inaccurate, slow, or faulty forward model of  motor control starting in 
infancy. Using EEG-based methods that allow excellent temporal assessment 
of neural processes, they found abnormal premotor activity in patients with 
schizophrenia in the ~100 ms preceding talking (Ford et al. 2007), with abnor-
malities being greater in patients with more severe auditory hallucinations and 
worse amotivation and avolition, respectively.
Several studies have investigated  action-perception loops in schizophre-
nia with particular reference to the understanding of  delusions of  control, 
and the belief that one’s actions are controlled by another agent (C. D. Frith 
2012; Blakemore, Smith et al. 2000; Frith et al. 2000a). The idea stems from 
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Helmholtz who pointed out that when we move our eyes, the world remains 
stationary, but if we poke our eye with our fi nger, the world appears to move. 
The normal attenuation of movement depends on relating the intention to move 
(or speak) with the anticipated sensory changes (the forward model). This is 
why we are unable to  tickle ourselves.  Schizophrenic patients with  delusion of 
 control can tickle themselves, presumably because something has gone wrong 
with this  perception-action loop. The same framework has been applied to 
other disorders in the experience and production of action.
Exploiting the Link between Movement 
Disorders and Cognitive Disorders
Based on the foregoing examples and related data, a view has emerged that 
movement disorders and cognitive disorders are linked. Thus, a framework 
that considers the crossover of action and cognition would be useful. For ex-
ample, in schizophrenia and  depression, disturbed notions of  agency are evi-
dent in individuals with these syndromes, but movement components are con-
sidered less frequently. In  Parkinson disease, one fi nds the opposite: a bias 
toward movement.
The application of principles that are consistent with the enactive agenda 
can be found in the domain of neurorehabilitation. One example is the  rehabili-
tation gaming system (RGS), which exploits  virtual reality-based interaction 
to incorporate  embodiment,  fi rst-person perspective, and goal-oriented action 
in rehabilitation protocols. RGS has been used by over 400 stroke patients in 
controlled clinical impact studies, and signifi cant impact on functional recov-
ery has been demonstrated (Cameirão et al. 2011, 2012). In a virtual reality 
therapy setup, Cameirão et al. have demonstrated the increased effectiveness 
of embodied versus disembodied therapy, noting the particular effectiveness 
of embodiment with a fi rst-person perspective, and that goal-directed action is 
more effective than repetitive action. Likewise, effective results are also seen 
when patients are placed in a social context (e.g., working with others), thus 
improving self-image.
Neural Prosthetics
 Neural  prosthetics offers a clear example of action-based learning and control 
(Schwartz 2004). In the scheme illustrated in Figure 20.2, we consider brain 
operation to be the creation of behavior and movement to be behavioral output. 
The cost function is generation of the desired movement.
One aspect of this approach is the need to map each neuron’s fi ring rate to 
movement. With intact subjects, this is relatively straightforward; movement 
parameters (e.g., arm direction) can be regressed against fi ring rate to cap-
ture a tuning function for each unit. This is more diffi cult with a paralyzed 
subject. Schwartz and colleagues have developed a “calibration” procedure 
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based on observation-driven cortical activity (Velliste et al. 2008; Tkach et 
al. 2008; Collinger et al. 2012). By demonstrating different movements to 
the subject who is actively monitoring the motion of the prosthetic device, 
neural activity in the motor cortex is elicited that can be used to estimate an 
initial tuning function. After an initial estimate, the process is iterated; the 
subject’s activity is gradually used to control the device by mixing their voli-
tional signal with a set of parameters that attenuate errors which would move 
the device away from the displayed target. The amount of assistance (error 
attenuation) is gradually reduced while the proportion of volitional drive is 
increased until the control signal is composed only of the subject’s extracted 
neural output.
The method of mixing volitional and autonomous control is called “shared 
mode”  control (Clanton et al. 2013). For instance, suppose a paralyzed subject 
is operating the arm/hand to reach, grasp, and manipulate an object. Advanced 
robotic algorithms have been developed to generate autonomous manipulation 
(Katz et al. 2013), and these autonomous signals can also be mixed with those 
derived from brain activity. This could be used to test the idea of  agency (e.g., 
by querying the subjects as to whether they were controlling the device, or if 
it was being controlled automatically as different ratios of automatic/volitional 
signals were mixed together within a neural prosthetic experiment). An open 











Figure 20.2 Neural prosthetic scheme: Electrodes in the brain record single-unit ac-
tivity. Many units are recorded simultaneously and this population is processed with 
an extraction algorithm. This algorithm is a model of the transformation between neu-
ral activity and movement intention. The model generates an estimate of the intended 
movement signal, and this serves as the control signal for an external device (here, a 
prosthetic replica of the arm and hand). The prosthetic device moves according to the 
estimated intention signal, and its action is visualized by the subject who registers any 
errors in the desired movement. The error drives a learning process in the brain which 
modifi es the neural output to reduce the error signal. Essentially, the brain is learning 
the extraction algorithm. This closed loop induces powerful learning, leading to high 
prosthetic performance.
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adds to the (motor) abilities of the agent over and above  tool use, in which the 
tool is usually experienced as clearly separate from the body (e.g., a hammer, 
a fork). Ehrsson et al. (2004) suggest that parietal regions mediate multisen-
sory matching of the  rubber hand, but that premotor cortex is related to the 
conscious experience of  embodiment. In contrast, current work (Seth, pers. 
comm.) is trying to identify how action may determine whether an object is 
perceived as embodied.
These experiments also show that single neurons encode multiple param-
eters in their fi ring rate patterns. For instance, many neurons in the motor corti-
ces of human and nonhuman primates have been found to contain neurons with 
tuning functions describing 10 degrees of freedom for hand and arm movement 
(Wodlinger et al. 2015). These tuning functions are not clustered in parameter 
space but seem to be distributed uniformly. Furthermore, neurons with differ-
ent tuning functions are located together anatomically in the same region of 
cortex. Finally, neurons with the same type of tuning function (cosine shaped) 
for movement can be found throughout the neural axis (Van Hemmen and 
Schwartz 2008). This suggests that the principle of directional tuning is widely 
distributed and not localized to specifi c structures.
 Societal Implications: How Can We Connect 
to Everyday Human Life?
A central goal of enactivist theory as proposed by Varela et al. (1992) was 
to address what it means to be human in everyday life, the ultimate aim be-
ing to address existential and ethical questions about the human condition: 
Who am I? What am I? How can I live a good life? Following  Merleau-Ponty, 
the human body can be viewed as both a physical structure and as a “lived-
in” phenomenological one. Thus, to move from a science of embodied cogni-
tion to an enactive understanding of human nature, it is necessary to bridge 
this gap. Varela et al. thought that progress in this direction could be made by 
connecting ideas which emanate from cognitive science—embodiment, dis-
tributed cognition (e.g., connectionism and Minsky’s “society of mind”), and 
self-organization and emergence—with insights external to science (e.g., from 
traditions such as Buddhist views on the groundless nature of the self). How 
does this enterprise to apply action-oriented cognitive science to the challenge 
of the human condition stand today?
Within contemporary action-oriented views, we discern a number of posi-
tions. For some, signifi cant progress toward addressing existential issues can 
be identifi ed through recent advances in our understanding of  consciousness 
and the  self (see Seth et al., this volume). By translating these theoretical in-
sights into more everyday conceptual language, action-oriented cognitive sci-
ence could play a more direct role in, for instance, the ongoing debate about 
the relationship between science and religion. For others, the action-oriented 
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approach, despite its focus on subjectivity, is seen as providing only third-
person insights into  consciousness and personhood, which are then of no 
immediate help to understanding the  fi rst-person human predicament. From 
this perspective, action-oriented cognitive science can only impact indirectly 
on existential considerations through the fi lter of nonscientifi c frameworks. 
Although the range of views on these issues is broad, there is general agree-
ment that through its emphasis on embodiedness, extended cognition, and in-
tersubjectivity, the action-oriented approach opens up new pathways for dia-
logue between the biological and psychological sciences, on one hand, and the 
social sciences and humanities, on the other.
Availability of Phenomenological Expertise
That phenomenology can contribute to cognitive science is a relatively new 
notion (Gallagher and Varela 2003). If the task of cognitive science is to ex-
plain how we experience, engage, and interact with the world, it is claimed 
that phenomenology provides a controlled descriptive method that is able to 
characterize the explanandum, without necessarily specifying the cognitive 
mechanism that explains it. This is not so much a division of labor—since the 
two tasks (description and explanation) depend on each other—but rather more 
a case of mutual enlightenment. This raises the following questions: Even if 
all people have access to experience, are they all equally good at describing it? 
Do we need experts in phenomenology to provide such descriptions? Do such 
descriptions differ between cultures?
While it is likely that there are clearly some aspects of variability related to 
culture and  experience, we may ask whether there are some universal invari-
ants. If “experts” perceive things that novices cannot perceive, as numerous 
studies in athletics show (see, e.g., Mann et al. 2007), this suggests that the 
depth and precision of access to experience can be increased through prac-
tice, and that a new vocabulary can be developed to allow precise communica-
tion. Thus, for example, Buddhists who practice  mindfulness mediation have a 
precise language for discussing detailed notions of phenomenological experi-
ence of different aspects of self (Trungpa 2002). Phenomenology, as well as 
Buddhist mindfulness, may offer important tools to allow us to develop insight 
into our everyday experiences.
The claim here is not that phenomenology is primary. Rather, according to 
what Varela (1996) calls the methodological principle of “mutual constraints,” 
phenomenology and cognitive science should maintain some consistency, so 
that if there is some disagreement between them about some particular phenom-
enon or process, further research will be necessary to resolve the difference.
Phenomenology has informed enactivist approaches to cognition. 
Phenomenological philosophers have argued that world or environment is 
not independent of mind or organism. We need to think of the  organism-en-
vironment (or the  mind- world) as an epistemic system. The dynamic systems 
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perspective of enactive  thinking provides descriptions of  agent-environment 
systems in which basic processes, including problems and pathologies, are 
described in relational terms: where problems involve some tension or con-
fl ict in the relation between the agent and environment. Brain-centered ap-
proaches tend to identify these problems entirely as occurring within the or-
ganism. An enactive approach would spread this out to examine the relations 
between brain, body, and environment and consider treatments in terms of 
those relations. Remedies could then be achieved by manipulating or inter-
vening with the brain, the body, the environment, or some mix of factors. We 
note that many domains of practical application already use such a systems 
view without it being inspired by enactive  thinking per se. Enactive research-
ers would like to push such approaches into much wider use than is currently 
the case.
Enactive Autonomy and Embodied Psychosocial Existence
As an example of how the  enactive view could be applied to everyday life, we 
conclude this section by summarizing Kyselo’s theory of the human self as 
 embodied psychosocial existence (Kyselo 2014), as it incorporates some key 
principles of the broader action-oriented approach. According to Kyselo, the 
enactive self can be operationally defi ned as a socially enacted autonomous 
system, whose systemic network identity emerges as a result of an ongoing 
engagement in processes of distinction (which promotes the existence of the 
individual in his/her own right) and participation (which promotes connected-
ness with others). Some implications for understanding and improving every-
day human life are as follows.
This view emphasizes that  human identity depends on others. The enactive 
view presupposes a deep dynamic interrelation between agent and world—a 
relation of mutual co-constitution. For the self, this means that the social world 
is not merely a context or developmentally relevant, but that without continu-
ously engaging with the social world of other people, without their contribu-
tion, no individual self can be generated or maintained. Human nature is not 
egocentric but genuinely relational. We are not embodied islands but existen-
tially dependent on each other as long as we live. Further, because we care for 
the maintenance of our identities, we continuously and adaptively evaluate 
ourselves and our interactions with others accordingly.
Self-maintenance involves tension and vulnerability. Cognitive identity is 
generated and maintained under precarious circumstances. For the human self, 
this means that both kinds of network processes—those that enable distinction 
as well as those that enable participation—are required together to bring about 
the individual as a network of autonomous self-other organization. Without dis-
tinction, the individual risks dissolving in social interaction dynamics. Without 
participation—acts of openness toward others—the individual eschews struc-
tural renewal, risking isolation. Both goals are in opposition, bringing about a 
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deep tension for the self that has to be negotiated. A useful insight for everyday 
life is that this tension is a necessity that cannot be avoided. Vulnerability and 
openness to others are appreciated as enabling the second dimension of self: 
the sense of being connected.
Human  identity and understanding others requires continuous negotiation. 
Tension and confl ict with others are to some extent unavoidable, since each in-
dividual is engaged in an interaction that strives to maintain this twofold sense 
of self. When two agents interact, their goal is not merely to reach consensus 
and harmony, but to reach it under particular conditions; namely, by acknowl-
edging that their respective individual goals are met. Combining these ideas 
with dynamic systems theory, Kyselo and Tschacher (2014) propose an ap-
proach for understanding relationship dynamics and the negotiation of close-
ness and distance within couples, and what this means for personal well-being 
and the likelihood of relationship maintenance.
Finally,  the twofold structure of the self, as distinct and participating, en-
tails a further useful insight: individuals are limited in their personal control 
over their self-constitution. Other people have a say in the construction of our 
identities and, given that they have perspectives and interests of their own, 
others do not always comply with what we would like or need. The enactive 
view contrasts with the increasing emphasis on  individualism in Western soci-
ety—that we should seek to be the omnipotent creators of our own lives—and 
suggests that a better understanding of the role of others in constructing the self 
could help people to be more at ease with themselves.
Concluding Remarks
An action-oriented perspective changes the role of an individual from a pas-
sive observer to an actively engaged agent interacting in a closed loop with the 
world as well as with others. Cognition exists to serve action within a land-
scape that contains both. Here we have offered an overview of this landscape, 
where action is not just the output of the system but also where the system is 
there for action. 
This perspective emphasizes a continuum of interaction between biology, 
psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities and has already had an im-
pact on science by changing the way we consider perception,  social cognition, 
and interaction, and the bases of their neurophysiological implementation. 
Other impacts can also be expected. For example, approaches in  engineering 
need to change to what we refer to as action-centered  systems engineering. 
Social implications are equally visible. From an action-oriented perspective, a 
human being is not an isolated individual responsible alone for his/her destiny, 
but rather a member of a grounded cultural system. The true test of these pro-
posed implications cannot be fully evaluated today but will require the test of 
time to determine if we have seen clearly into the future.
From “The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science,” 
Andreas K. Engel, Karl J. Friston, and Danica Kragic, eds. 2016. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18, 
series ed. J. Lupp. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-03432-6. 
356 P. F. Dominey et al. 
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank our distinguished colleagues from the Forum for providing 
additional input to the chapter, including Judith M. Ford, Jürgen Jost, Miriam Kyselo, 
Friedemann Pulvermüller, Gottfried Vosgerau, Peter König, Paul Verschure, Marek 
McGann, Chris Frith, and Gabriella Vigliocco.
From “The Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science,” 
Andreas K. Engel, Karl J. Friston, and Danica Kragic, eds. 2016. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 18, 
series ed. J. Lupp. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-03432-6. 
Bibliography 
Note: Numbers in square brackets denote the chapter in which an entry is cited. 
Albu-Schäffer, A., O. Eiberger, M. Grebenstein, et al. 2008. Soft Robotics. IEEE Robot. Autom. Mag. 
15:20–30. [20] 
Autumn, K., M. Sitti, Y. A. Liang, et al. 2002. Evidence for Van Der Waals Adhesion in Gecko Setae. 
PNAS 99:12252–12256. [20] 
Bajcsy, R. 1988. Active Perception. IEEE Proc. 76:966–1005 [20] 
Ballard, D. H. 1991. Animate Vision. Artif. Intell. 48:57–86. [02, 20] 
Berthier, M. L., and F. Pulvermüller. 2011. Neuroscience Insights Improve Neurorehabilitation of 
Post-Stroke Aphasia. Nat. Rev. Neurol. 7:86–97. [20] 
Biederman, I. 1987. Recognition-by-Components: A Theory of Human Image Understanding. Psychol. 
Rev. 94:115–147. [20] 
Björkman, M., Y. Bekiroglu, V. Högman, and D. Kragic. 2013. Enhancing Visual Perception of Shape 
through Tactile Glances. In: IEEE/RSJ Intl. Conf. on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), pp. 
3180–3186. Tokyo: IEEE. [11, 20] 
Blakemore, S. J., J. Smith, S. Steel, E. C. Johnstone, and C. D. Frith. 2000. The Perception of Self-Produced 
Sensory Stimuli in Patients with Auditory Hallucinations and Passivity Experiences:  Evidence for 
a Breakdown in Self-Monitoring. Psychol. Med. 30:1131–1139. [15, 20] 
Blickhan, R., A. Seyfarth, H. Geyer, et al. 2007. Intelligence by Mechanics. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 
365:199–220. [20] 
Brincker, M., and E. B. Torres. 2013. Noise from the Periphery in Autism. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 
7:Article 34. [20] 
Brooks, R. A. 1986. A Robust Layered Control System for a Mobile Robot. IEEE J. Robot. Autom. 
2:14–23. [20] 
———. 1989. A Robot That Walks: Emergent Behaviors from a Carefully Evolved Network. Neural 
Comput. 1:153–162. [20] 
———. 1991. Intelligence without Reason. In: Proc. 12th Intl. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1, 
pp. 569–595 Sydney: Morgan Kaufmann. [20] 
———. 1991. Intelligence without Representation. Artif. Intell. 47:139–159. [01, 07, 18, 20] 
Brown, E., N. Rodenberg, J. Amend, et al. 2010. From the Cover: Universal Robotic Gripper Based on the 
Jamming of Granular Material. PNAS 107:18809–18814. [20] 
Cameirão, M. S., S. B. Bermudez, E. D. Oller, and P. F. M. J. Verschure. 2011. Virtual Reality Based 
Rehabilitation Speeds up Functional Recovery of the Upper Extremities after Stroke: A 
Randomized Controlled Pilot Study in the Acute Phase of Stroke Using the Rehabilitation Gaming 
System. Restor. Neurol. Neurosci. 29:1–12. [20] 
Cameirão, M. S., S. B. i Badia, E. Duarte, A. Frisoli, and P. F. M. J. Verschure. 2012. The Combined Impact 
of Virtual Reality Neurorehabilitation and Its Interfaces on Upper Extremity Functional Recovery 
in Patients with Chronic Stroke. Stroke 43:2720–2728. [19, 20] 
Carruthers, P., and P. K. Smith. 1996. Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
[20] 
Cattaneo, L., M. Fabbri-Destro, S. Boria, et al. 2007. Impairment of Actions Chains in Autism and Its 
Possible Role in Intention Understanding. PNAS 104:17825–17830. [03, 20] 
Clanton, S. T., A. J. C. McMorland, Z. Zohny, et al. 2013. Seven Degree of Freedom Cortical Control of a 
Robotic Arm. Brain-Computer Interface Res.73–81. [20] 
Collinger, J. L., B. Wodlinger, J. E. Downey, et al. 2012. High-Performance Neuroprosthetic Control by an 
Individual with Tetraplegia. Lancet 38:557–564. [20] 
Collins, T., T. Heed, and B. Röder. 2010. Visual Target Selection and Motor Planning Define Attentional 
Enhancement at Perceptual Processing Stages. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:14. [20] 
Collins, T., T. Schicke, and B. Röder. 2008. Action Goal Selection and Motor Planning Can Be Dissociated 
by Tool Use. Cognition 109:363–371. [20] 
Cook, J. L., S. J. Blakemore, J. Smith, et al. 2013. Atypical Basic Movement Kinematics in Autism 
Spectrum Conditions. Brain 136:2816–2824. [20] 
Craighero, L., L. Fadiga, G. Rizzolatti, and C. Umilta. 1999. Action for Perception: A Motor-Visual 
Attentional Effect. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 25:1673–1692. [20] 
David, N., J. Schultz, E. Milne, et al. 2014. Right Temporoparietal Gray Matter Predicts Accuracy of Social 
Perception in the Autism Spectrum. J. Autism Dev. Disord. 44:1433–1446. [20] 
De Jaegher, H., E. Di Paolo, and S. Gallagher. 2010. Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition? 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 14:441–447. [16, 20] 
Deimel, R., C. Eppner, J. Álvarez-Ruiz, M. Maertens, and O. Brock. 2013. Exploitation of Environmental 
Constraints in Human and Robotic Grasping. Intl. Symp. Robot. Res. 2013:116. [20] 
Dewey, J. 1896. The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology. Psychol. Rev. 3:357–370. [09, 11, 20] 
———. 1897. My Pedagogic Creed. The School Journal 54:77–80. [20] 
———. 1900. The School and Society. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [20] 
———. 1902. The Child and the Curriculum. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [20] 
———. 1916. Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. [20] 
———. 1938. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. [20] 
Di Paolo, E. A., and H. De Jaegher. 2012. The Interactive Brain Hypothesis. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:163. 
[01, 11, 20] 
Di Paolo, E. A., M. Rohde, and H. De Jaegher. 2010. Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social 
Interaction and Play. In: Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, ed. J. Stewart 
et al., pp. 33–87. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [11, 15, 20] 
Dominey, P. F., and C. Dodane. 2004. Indeterminacy in Language Acquisition: The Role of Child Directed 
Speech and Joint Attention. J. Neuroling. 17:121–145. [20] 
Donner, T., A. Kettermann, E. Diesch, et al. 2000. Involvement of the Human Frontal Eye Field and 
Multiple Parietal Areas in Covert Visual Selection During Conjunction Search. Eur. J. Neurosci. 
12:3407–3414. [20] 
Ehrsson, H. H., C. Spence, and R. E. Passingham. 2004. That's My Hand! Activity in Premotor Cortex 
Reflects Feeling of Ownership of a Limb. Science 305:875–877. [20] 
Eimer, M., and J. van Velzen. 2006. Covert Manual Response Preparation Triggers Attentional 
Modulations of Visual but Not Auditory Processing. Clin. Neurophysiol. 117:1063–1074. [20] 
Engel, A. K. 2010. Directive Minds: How Dynamics Shapes Cognition. In: Enaction: Towards a New 
Paradigm for Cognitive Science, ed. J. Stewart et al., pp. 219–243. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
[01, 11, 20] 
Engel, A. K., A. Maye, M. Kurthen, and P. König. 2013. Where’s the Action? The Pragmatic Turn in 
Cognitive Science. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17:202–209. [01, 02, 04, 05, 08, 09, 11, 13, 15, 18, 20] 
Fabbri-Destro, M., L. Cattaneo, S. Boria, and G. Rizzolatti. 2009. Planning Actions in Autism. Exp. Brain 
Res. 192:521–525. [03, 20] 
Fagioli, S., B. Hommel, and R. I. Schubotz. 2007. Intentional Control of Attention: Action Planning Primes 
Action-Related Stimulus Dimensions. Psychol. Res. 71:22–29. [20] 
Fitzpatrick, P. M., and G. Metta. 2002. Towards Manipulation-Driven Vision. IEEE/RSJ Intl. Conf. on 
Intelligent Robots and Systems, pp. 43–48. Lausanne: IEEE. [20] 
Ford, J. M., B. J. Roach, W. O. Faustman, and D. H. Mathalon. 2007. Synch before You Speak: Auditory 
Hallucinations in Schizophrenia. Am. J. Psychiatry 164:458–466. [15, 20] 
Frith, C. D. 2012. Explaining Delusions of Control: The Comparator Model 20 Years on. Conscious. Cogn. 
21:52–54. [15, 20] 
Frith, C. D., S.-J. Blakemore, and D. M. Wolpert. 2000. Abnormalities in the Awareness and Control of 
Action. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 355:1771–1788. [14, 15, 20] 
Gallagher, S. 2004. Understanding Interpersonal Problems in Autism: Interaction Theory as an Alternative 
to Theory of Mind. Philos. Psychiatr. Psychol. 11:199–217. [20] 
Gallagher, S., and F. Varela. 2003. Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences. Can. J. Philos. 29:93–132. [20] 
Gallagher, S., and S. Varga. 2015. Conceptual Issues in Autism Spectrum Disorders. Curr. Opin. 
Psychiatry 28:127–132. [20] 
Gallagher, S., and D. Zahavi. 2012. The Phenomenological Mind. London: Routledge. [20] 
Gallese, V., M. J. Rochat, and C. Berchio. 2013. The Mirror Mechanism and Its Potential Role in Autism 
Spectrum Disorder. Dev. Med. Child Neurol. 55:15–22. [20] 
Haugeland, J. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [20] 
Hilton, C., Y. Zhang, M. White, C. L. Klohr, and J. Constantino. 2012. Motor Impairment Concordant and 
Discordant for Autism Spectrum Disorders. Autism 16:430–441. [20] 
Hipp, J. F., A. K. Engel, and M. Siegel. 2011. Oscillatory Synchronization in Large-Scale Cortical 
Networks Predicts Perception. Neuron 69:387–396. [20] 
Hoffmann, M., and V. C. Müller. 2014. Trade-Offs in Exploiting Body Morphology for Control: From 
Simple Bodies and Model-Based Control to Complex Bodies with Model-Free Distributed Control 
Schemes. In: E-book on Opinions and Outlooks on Morphological Computation, ed H. Hauser et 
al. http://www.merlin.uzh.ch/contributionDocument/download/7499 (accessed Oct. 15, 2015). 
[20] 
Hoffmann, M., N. Schmidt, R. Pfeifer, A. K. Engel, and A. Maye. 2012. Using Sensorimotor Contingencies 
for Terrain Discrimination and Adaptive Walking Behavior in the Quadruped Robot Puppy. In: 
From Animals to Animats 12, ed. T. Ziemke et al., pp. 54–56. Heidelberg: Springer. [20] 
Högman, V., M. Björkman, and D. Kragic. 2013. Interactive Object Classification Using Sensorimotor 
Contingencies. In: IEEE/RSJ Intl. Conf. on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), pp. 
2799–2805. Tokyo: IEEE. [11, 20] 
Horn, B. K. 1986. Robot Vision (1st edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. [18, 20] 
Hutto, D. D., and E. Myin. 2013. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. [06, 07, 20] 
Kalakrishnan, M., J. Buchli, P. Pastor, M. Mistry, and S. Schaal. 2010. Learning, Planning, and Control for 
Quadruped Locomotion over Challenging Terrain. Int. J. Rob. Res. 30:236–258. [20] 
Kanwisher, N., J. McDermott, and M. M. Chun. 1997. The Fusiform Face Area: A Module in Human 
Extrastriate Cortex Specialized for Face Perception. J. Neurosci. 17:4302–4311. [20] 
Kietzmann, T. C., S. Geuter, and P. König. 2011. Overt Visual Attention as a Causal Factor of Perceptual 
Awareness. PLoS One 6:e22614. [11, 20] 
Kim, S., M. Spenko, S. Trujillo, et al. 2007. Whole Body Adhesion: Hierarchical, Directional and 
Distributed Control of Adhesive Forces for a Climbing Robot. IEEE Intl. Conf. on Robotics and 
Automation (ICRA), pp. 1268–1273. Rome: IEEE. [20] 
Knoblich, G., S. Butterfill, and N. Sebanz. 2011. Psychological Research on Joint Action: Theory and Data. 
Psychol. Learn. Motiv. 54:59–101. [20] 
Kyselo, M. 2014. The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self. Front. Psychol. 5: [12, 15, 20] 
Kyselo, M., and W. Tschacher. 2014. An Enactive and Dynamical Systems Theory Account of Dyadic 
Relationships. Front. Psychol. 5:452. [20] 
Lindgren, R., and M. Johnson-Glenberg. 2013. Emboldened by Embodiment Six Precepts for Research on 
Embodied Learning and Mixed Reality. Educ. Res. 42:445–452. [20] 
Lindgren, R., and J. M. Moshell. 2011. Supporting Children's Learning with Body-Based Metaphors in a 
Mixed Reality Environment. In: Proc. 10th Intl. Conf. on Interaction Design and Children, ed. T. 
Moher et al., pp. 177–180. New York: ACM. [20] 
Macrae, C. N., and G. V. Bodenhausen. 2000. Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically About Others. 
Annu. Rev. Psychol. 51:93–120. [20] 
Mann, D. T., A. M. Williams, P. Ward, and C. M. Janelle. 2007. Perceptual-Cognitive Expertise in Sport: A 
Meta-Analysis. J. Sport Exerc. Psychol. 29:457. [20] 
Marr, D. 1982. Vision : A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of 
Visual Information. New York: W. H. Freeman. [01, 03, 20] 
McGann, M. 2007. Enactive Theorists Do It on Purpose: Toward an Enactive Account of Goals and 
Goal-Directedness. Phenom. Cogn. Sci. 6:463–483. [20] 
McGeer, T. 1990. Passive Dynamic Walking. Int. J. Rob. Res. 9:62–82. [20] 
Menary, R. 2007. Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
[13, 20] 
———. 2010. The Extended Mind and Cognitive Integration. In: The Extended Mind, ed. R. Menary, pp. 
227–244. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [20] 
Moore, T., and M. Fallah. 2001. Control of Eye Movements and Spatial Attention. PNAS 98:1273–1276. 
[20] 
Moravec, H. P. 1983. The Stanford Cart and the CMU Rover. IEEE Proc. 71:872–884. [20] 
Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [01, 07, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20] 
O’Regan, J. K., and A. Noë. 2001. A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 24:939–973; discussion 973–1031. [01, 02, 04, 05, 06, 08, 09, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 
20] 
Özçalışkan, Ş., S. Goldin-Meadow, D. Gentner, and C. Mylander. 2009. Does Language About Similarity 
Foster Children’s Similarity Comparisons? Cognition 112:217–228. [20] 
Peirce, C. S. 1887. Logical Machines. Modern Logic. Am. J. Psychol. 1:165–170. [20] 
Pfeifer, R., M. Lungarella, and F. Iida. 2012. The Challenges Ahead for Bio-Inspired “Soft” Robotics. 
Commun. ACM 55:76–87. [20] 
Pfeifer, R., and C. Scheier. 1999. Understanding Intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [02, 14, 18, 20] 
Pickering, M. J., and S. Garrod. 2013. An Integrated Theory of Language Production and Comprehension. 
Behav. Brain Sci. 36:329–347. [04, 09, 20] 
Prinz, W. 2012. Open Minds: The Social Making of Agency and Intentionality. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. [17, 20] 
Righetti, L., M. Kalakrishnan, P. Pastor, et al. 2014. An Autonomous Manipulation System Based on Force 
Control and Optimization. Auton. Robots 36:11–30. [20] 
Riley, M. A., M. J. Richardson, K. Shockley, and V. C. Ramenzoni. 2011. Interpersonal Synergies. Front. 
Psychol. 2:38. [20] 
Rizzolatti, G., and L. Craighero. 2004. The Mirror-Neuron System. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27:169–192. [01, 
02, 04, 09, 11, 20] 
Rizzolatti, G., L. Riggio, I. Dascola, and C. Umiltá. 1987. Reorienting Attention across the Horizontal and 
Vertical Meridians: Evidence in Favor of a Premotor Theory of Attention. Neuropsychologia 
25:31–40. [20] 
Rowe, M. L., and S. Goldin-Meadow. 2009. Early Gesture Selectively Predicts Later Language Learning. 
Dev. Sci. 12:182–187. [20] 
Sastry, S. 1999. Nonlinear Systems: Analysis, Stability and Control. New York: Springer. [20] 
Schilbach, L., B. Timmermans, V. Reddy, et al. 2013. Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience. Behav. 
Brain Sci. 36:393–414. [01, 03, 20] 
Schwartz, A. B. 2004. Cortical Neural Prosthetics. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27:487–507. [20] 
Sebanz, N., H. Bekkering, and G. Knoblich. 2006. Joint Action: Bodies and Minds Moving Together. 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 10:70–76. [01, 20] 
Semini, C., V. Barasuol, T. Boaventura, M. Frigerio, and J. Buchli. 2013. Is Active Impedance the Key to a 
Breakthrough for Legged Robots? In: Proc. Intl. Symp. on Robotics Research (ISRR), Springer 
Star Series. Zürich: ETH-Zürich. [20] 
Siegel, M., T. H. Donner, R. Oostenveld, P. Fries, and A. K. Engel. 2008. Neuronal Synchronization Along 
the Dorsal Visual Pathway Reflects the Focus of Spatial Attention. Neuron 60:709–719. [20] 
Thrun, S., M. Montemerlo, H. Dahlkamp, et al. 2006. The Robot That Won the DARPA Grand Challenge. 
J. Field Robotics 23:661–692. [20] 
Tkach, D., J. Reimer, and N. G. Hatsopoulos. 2008. Observation-Based Learning for Brain-Machine 
Interfaces. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 18:589–594. [20] 
Torres, E. B. 2013. Atypical Signatures of Motor Variability Found in an Individual with ASD. Neurocase 
19:150–165. [20] 
Torres, E. B., M. Brincker, R. W. Isenhower, et al. 2013. Autism: The Micro-Movement Perspective. Front. 
Integr. Neurosci. 7:32. [20] 
Trevarthen, C., and J. T. Delafield-Butt. 2013. Autism as a Developmental Disorder in Intentional 
Movement and Affective Engagement. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 7:49. [20] 
Trimmer, B. 2013. A Journal of Soft Robotics: Why Now? Soft Robotics 1:1–4. [20] 
Trungpa, C. 2002. Cutting through Spiritual Materialism. London: Shambhala Publications. [20] 
Van Hemmen, J. L., and A. B. Schwartz. 2008. Population Vector Code: A Geometric Universal as 
Actuator. Biol. Cybern. 98:509–518. [20] 
Varela, F. J. 1996. Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem. J. Conscious. 
Stud. 3:330–349. [20] 
Varela, F. J., E. Thompson, and E. Rosch. 1992. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 
Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [01, 09, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20] 
Velliste, M., S. Perel, M. C. Spalding, A. S. Whitford, and A. B. Schwartz. 2008. Cortical Control of a 
Prosthetic Arm for Self-Feeding. Nature 453:1098–1101. [20] 
Walker, E., and R. J. Lewine. 1990. Prediction of Adult-Onset Schizophrenia from Childhood Home 
Movies of the Patients. Am. J. Psychiatry 147:1052–1056. [15, 20] 
Whyatt, C., and C. Craig. 2013. Sensory-Motor Problems in Autism. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 7:51. [20] 
Wilson, M. 2002. Six Views of Embodied Cognition. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 9:625–636. [15, 20] 
Wodlinger, B., J. E. Downey, E. C. Tyler-Kabara, et al. 2015. Ten-Dimensional Anthropomorphic Arm 
Control in a Human Brain−Machine Interface: Difficulties, Solutions, and Limitations. J. Neural 
Eng. 12:016011. [20] 
Yarbus, A. L. 1967. Eye Movements and Vision. New York: Plenum Press. [20] 
